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Abstract. Introducing assets backed by physical collateral, we extend the Cornet and De Bois-
deﬀre (2002) model of asymmetric information to allow for default. We show that, independently
of the ﬁnancial-informational structure, equilibrium exists.
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1. Introduction
In a two-period incomplete markets economy with nominal assets, Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre
(2002) contribute to the theory of asymmetric information extending the classical non-arbitrage asset
pricing procedure. They propose a decentralized mechanism in which agents anticipate asset prices
and make, before the trade of commodities and assets, a reﬁnement of their signals by precluding
arbitrage opportunities.
In this context, a vector of asset prices is implementable as equilibrium only if the pooling
information, obtained after the exclusion of arbitrage opportunities, is non-empty (see De Boisdeﬀre
(2007)). In particular, there are ﬁnancial structures for which only asset prices that fully reveal
information are equilibria.
To illustrate this point, consider a two-period economy with two states of nature in the second
period, {u,d}. There is only one commodity and only one asset, an Arrow security contingent to
s = u. There are two types of agents, {A,B}. Individuals of type A are uninformed about the
realization of the uncertainty, while individuals of type B know that the state s = d will occur
with certainty. Then, applying the reﬁnement mechanism of Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre (2002), only
when the asset has zero price the pooling information (obtained by the elimination of arbitrage
opportunities) will be non-empty. Furthermore, in the unique equilibrium, there is no trade and
uninformed agents became fully informed.
Note that when an agent anticipates an asset price, she believe that it is a non-arbitrage price.
Thus, the individual never anticipates asset prices that give unbounded gains today without any
risk tomorrow. For this reason, in the preceding example, type B individuals will never anticipate
a positive price for the asset.
Moreover, the existence of a ﬁnancial position that gives unbounded gains tomorrow without any
cost today will be interpreted by any agent as a signal that some states of nature will not occur.
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This will induce agents to reﬁne their private information. For instance, in our example, uninformed
individuals will become fully informed when they anticipate a zero price.
A natural question arises: for which reason uninformed individuals anticipate a zero price (be-
coming fully informed)? Following Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre (2002) this happens because, even
without rational expectations, agents will coincide in their forecasted prices. In fact, given that
credit markets are frictionless, informed individual always will anticipate a zero price.
On the other hand, when borrowers can default, ﬁnancial markets need to implement mechanisms
to protect lenders of excessive losses. Usually, these mechanisms will set limits on the amount of debt
and, therefore, may also preclude (endogenously) the unbounded gains associated to an arbitrage
opportunity. For instance, in the previous example, if we burden borrowers to constitute collateral
requirements that will be seized in case of default, then a positive price for the Arrow security
may emerge. In fact, the ﬁnancial frictions induced by the collateral constraints will prevent type
B agents from obtaining unbounded gains when the security has a positive price. Therefore, new
equilibria will appear when default is allowed.
In this paper, we extend the model of Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre (2002) to allow for default and
collateral, as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002). We prove that equilibrium always exists, with no
need to update information through a predeﬁned (centralized or decentralized) mechanism. In this
sense, the set of common non-arbitrage prices will increase when default is allowed.
Essentially, Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre (2002) point out that in the absence of default, a non-
arbitrage price (common to every agent) may no longer exist, thus agents may need to update
information to preclude arbitrage opportunities. When default is allowed and assets are collater-
alized, the existence of a margin between the market value of the collateral and the asset price
will bound the amount of wealth that more informed borrowers extract from less informed lenders.
Thus, endogenously, markets only allow for limited arbitrage opportunities and physical-ﬁnancial
trade becomes possible. Alternatively, from the perspective of an environment that allows agents
to update information before commodities and assets can be traded, we focus on the second stage.
Thus, we assure the existence of equilibrium independently of either the nature of the mechanism
that was used to update information or the ﬁnal distribution of information.
2. Collateralized assets in an economy with asymmetric information
2.1. Model. We consider a discrete time economy with two periods, t ∈ {0,1}. There is no uncer-
tainty at t = 0 and we denote by s = 0 the unique state of nature at this date. At t = 1, there is a
ﬁnite set S of states of nature that can be reached. Let Σ = {0}
S
S.
There is a ﬁnite set of commodities, L, that can be traded at each s ∈ Σ. Commodities may
suﬀer depreciation contingent on the state of nature. Thus, if one unit of good l ∈ L is consumed
in t = 0, an amount Ys(l,l0) of the good l0 ∈ L is obtained at s ∈ S. Given s ∈ S, the matrix
Ys = (Ys(l,l0))(l,l0)∈L×L has non-negative entries. Note that we allow for perishable and perfect
durable goods in our economy.
As in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), the ﬁnancial sector is characterized by a ﬁnite set J of
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states s ∈ S. More formally, each j ∈ J is characterized by a process (A(s,j); s ∈ S) ∈ R
L×S
+
of state contingent real promises, and by its physical unitary collateral requirements, Cj ∈ RL
+.
Collateral guarantees are always held by the borrowers.
Following Cornet and De Boisdeﬀre (2002), there is a ﬁnite number of agents, h ∈ H, that have
a private information Sh ⊂ S about the states of nature that will occur in t = 1. This private
information is correct in the sense that the true state will belong to Sh. Therefore, the state of
nature that actually will occur in t = 1 will belong into the pooled information set: S :=
T
h Sh.
Each h ∈ H may trade assets at t = 0, and can buy commodities at each s ∈ Σh := {0} ∪ Sh.
The consumer h ∈ H is also characterized by his endowments, wh = (wh
s;s ∈ Σh) ∈ R
Σh×L
+ , and by
his preferences over consumption, that are represented by a function Uh : R
Σh×L
+ → R+.
The consumption allocation of h ∈ H is denoted by xh = (xh
s; s ∈ Σh). We denote by θh
j
(resp. ϕh
j) the quantity of asset j that agent h buys (resp. short-sells). Let θh = (θh
j ; j ∈ J) and
ϕh = (ϕh
j; j ∈ J).
We assume that each h ∈ H observes commodity prices at t = 0, p0 ∈ RL
+, and anticipate a
vector of asset prices qh ∈ RJ
+. Moreover, future (state contingent) commodity prices will also be
anticipated by h, denominated ph
s ∈ RL
+ for each s ∈ Sh. Let ph = (ph
s;s ∈ Sh).
Individuals trade assets and demand commodities after the anticipation of prices. As the only
penalty in case of default is the seizure of the collateral guarantees, borrowers will pay the min-
imum between the depreciated value of the collateral and the market value of the original debt.
Thus, as any agent h believes that her forecasted prices are correct, she will anticipate that the




Therefore, given prices (p0,ph,qh), each agent h ∈ H will choose an allocation (xh,θh,ϕh) in his




+, which is given by the collection of vectors
(x,θ,ϕ) = ((xs)s∈Σh, (θj,ϕj)j∈J) ∈ Eh such that, x0 ≥
P
j∈J Cjϕj and








Ds,j(ph)(θj − ϕj), ∀s ∈ Sh.
Definition. An equilibrium for our economy is given by a vector of prices (p0,(ph,qh)h∈H) jointly




h∈H Eh, such that,
(a) For each h ∈ H, (xh,θ
h
,ϕh) ∈ argmax(x,θ,ϕ)∈Bh(p0,ph,qh) Uh(x).






















0, ∀s ∈ S.
(c) For each (h,h0) ∈ H×H, qh = qh
0
. Moreover, at each s ∈ S, ph
s = ph
0
s , for all (h,h0) ∈ H×H.
Note that, as in De Boisdesﬀre (2007), we assume that in equilibrium forecasted prices coincide
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individuals and information is private.1 However, individuals do not need to coincide about the
expected commodity prices at states of nature s / ∈ S.
2.2. Equilibrium existence. As we point out earlier, the existence of collateral guarantees a natu-
ral mechanism to protect lenders in case of default and will induce endogenous bounds on short-sales.
Thus, as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), equilibrium will always exist, even when agents do not
make any reﬁnement of their private information.
Theorem. Assume that,




B. For each j ∈ J, Cj 6= 0.
C. For each h ∈ H, Uh : R
Σh×L
+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave.
D. For each j ∈ J, there exists s ∈
S
Sh such that (A(s,j),YsCj)  0.
Then, given any vector of commodity prices forecasts (ˆ ph







for our economy in which ph
s = ˆ ph
s for any (s,h) ∈
(Sh \ S) × H.
Proof. Let Σ = {0} ∪ S and, for each h ∈ H, deﬁne ηh = (ˆ ph
s)s∈(Sh\S). As in Geanakoplos
and Zame (2002), collateral constraints jointly with feasibility conditions (item (b) of equilibrium
deﬁnition) will assure that, under Assumption B, equilibrium individual allocations, if there exists,
are uniformly bounded at the states s ∈ Σ, independently of the price level. Now, as ηh  0,
budget restrictions will imply that consumption allocations of agent h at nodes s ∈ Sh \ S are also
uniformly bounded.
Thus, for each h ∈ H there exists a non-empty, compact and convex set Kh ⊂ Eh such that, to
ﬁnd an equilibrium we can restrict, without loss of generality, individual h to choose budget feasible








+ : k(p0,q)k1 = 1; kµsk1 = 1, ∀s ∈ S},
where k · k1 denotes the norm of the sum.
We will ﬁnd an equilibrium for our economy as a ﬁxed point of a set-value mapping. To attempt
this objective we deﬁne, for each h ∈ H, a correspondence Ψh : P  Kh by
Ψh(p0,(µs)s∈S,q) = Argmax(x,θ,ϕ)∈Bh(p0,ph,q)∩Kh Uh(x),
where ph = ((µs)s∈S,ηh).
1Without imposing rational expectations hypotheses, in a contemporaneous working paper, Daher, Martins-da-
Rocha, P´ ascoa and Vailakis (2006) analyze a temporary equilibrium model with collateralized asset, in which agents
are allowed to have beliefs about the characteristics of the others. In this context, the perfect foresight behaviour
described in our model may appear, for some readers, as more natural.COLLATERALIZED ASSETS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 5
Moreover, if ∆
L+J
+ := {z ∈ RL
+ × RJ
+ : kzk1 = 1} and ∆L
+ := {z ∈ RL
+ : kzk1 = 1}, let
Ψ0 :
Q
h∈H Kh  ∆
L+J












and, for each s ∈ S, deﬁne Ψs :
Q










Now, it is not diﬃcult to see that, under Assumptions A-C and as a consequence of Berge
Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 16.31) each one of the correspon-
dences above is upper hemicontinuous and has non-empty, convex and compact values. There-
fore, as the set P ×
Q
h∈H Kh is non-empty, convex and compact, it follows from Kakutani Fixed
Point Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Corollary 16.51) that there exists a ﬁxed point,
[(p0,(µs)s∈S,q);(xh,θ
h
,ϕh)h∈H], for the set-value mapping Ω : P ×
Q











Let, for each h ∈ H, ph := ((µs)s∈S,ηh). Under Assumption C and D, analogous arguments to




is an equilibrium for our economy. Finally, by construction, we have that, for each h ∈ H, equilibrium
prices ph
s coincide with forecasted prices ˆ ph
s, for any s ∈ Sh \ S. 
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